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Rewriting the Merger Laws:
Global Versus Incremental Approaches
The Proposed "Merger Modernization Act
of 1986" and "Antitrust Improvement
Act of 1986"
Testimony Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee
April 9, 1986

by
JOSEPH F. BRODLEY*

Introduction
The antitrust laws speak in words of constitutional generality, enunciating their basic standards in terms of restraint of trade and injury to
competition. To give content to these broad concepts, courts formulate
legal rules rooted in specific adjudications, informed by detailed factual
records and expert testimony. In addition, in the merger field and certain other areas the Department of Justice has issued detailed guidelines
to inform business even more precisoly about current enforcement policies. Over time judicial interpretations and enforcement guidelines have
evolved in the light of accumulated enforcement experience and increased economic knowledge. But until now the legislative foundations
of substantive antitrust law and of merger law have responded to changing economic circumstances by incremental adjustment.
Recently, however, the Justice Department proposed a radical
deviation from the policy of incremental adjustment and change. In
1986 on behalf of the Administration the Justice Department presented
several major amendments to the antitrust laws. These included a revision of the merger law, called "The Merger Modernization Act of
*
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1986,"1 that would have altered the key substantive language of section 7
of the Clayton Act, 2 substituting in place of the historic test, "substantially to lessen competition... or... tend to create a monopoly," a quite
different and more particularized test of illegality. Indeed, had it been
adopted, the proposal would have codified substantial portions of the Department's Merger Guidelines, revised most recently in 1984. 3 The legislative proposal was all the more surprising since the attempt to codify the
recent Merger Guidelines was not informed by judicial interpretation of
the Guidelines. In fact, since 1981 the Department has not presented
substantive issues of merger policy to the courts. When private litigants
have brought merger cases that might evoke substantive rulings, the Justice Department has attacked their standing to litigate.
Introduced contemporaneously with the Administration Bill was a
counterproposal by Senator Metzenbaum, presently Chairman of the
Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, called "The Antitrust Improvement Act
of 1986." 4 Less sweeping than the Administration proposal, the Metzenbaum Bill would nevertheless have made several important changes in
antitrust law.
These recent legislative proposals are of more than passing interest.
While neither was enacted, extensive hearings were held, and typically
proposals for antitrust revision germinate for several years before they
are accepted. Thus, the issue these proposals raise concerning global versus incremental change in merger policy may recur. What follows is essentially the testimony I delivered as a committee witness before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the two proposed merger enactments. 5
I.

Substantial Changes in Existing Law

The proposed Merger Modernization Act would change the basic
language of section 7 of the Clayton Act by eliminating the central substantive test, which for seventy-two years has been framed in terms of
upholding competition and preventing monopoly, and substituting in its
place an entirely new statutory term, "increased market power." There
can be no clearer signal of a fundamental policy change than the radical
alteration of the core language of a statute. The proposal is all the more
1.

S.2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S2280 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1986) [herein-

after S.2160].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914)).
3. 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
4490-4495, 4500-4505 (1984) [hereinafter Guidelines].
4. S.2022, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S335 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1986) [hereinafter S. 2022].

5. The original text of my testimony can be found in Hearingson S. 2022 and S. 2160
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-105 (1986).
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striking in view of the fact that no previous antitrust statute has used
any term other than "lessening of competition," "monopolization," or
"restraints of trade" to indicate the object of prohibition. -In Europe,
antitrust is even called "competition policy."
Substitution of the words "increased market power" for "lessening
of competition" would narrow the enforcement goals of the Clayton Act
as well as those of the Sherman Act 6 and other antitrust statutes. 7 The
term "increased market power," which is defined as the ability to charge
higher than competitive prices and still make a profit,8 is narrower than
the lessening of competition concept that it replaces because it describes
only a single, immediate consequence of reduced competition-the ability to raise prices. But competition as it has been conceived in antitrust
law, both in the United States and in Europe, also means rivalry in innovation, and in the quality and variety of products, equality of access to
scarce resources, preservation of alternative centers of decision-making,
and a general preference for the competitive process as the social instrument for achieving material well being. Thus, the present statute is aimed
not only at preventing immediate and near-term monopolistic price increases, but also at maintaining a competitive environment favorable for
long-term economic welfare.
In addition to narrowing the goals of the antitrust statutes, the new
legal standard contained in the Merger Modernization Act would drastically alter both the substantive content of merger law as enunciated by
the courts and the method of proof in antitrust cases. In describing these
changes, I am not suggesting that existing merger doctrine is desirable in
all respects. My point is to demonstrate how extensive the changes
would be and how sharply this legislative approach contrasts with the
incremental common-law method by which antitrust doctrine has in the
past gradually evolved. 9
6.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).

7. Although S. 2160 redefines competition only under § 7 of the Clayton Act, it would
also immediately raise the issue of similar redefinition of established norms under the Sherman
Act and other antitrust statutes, due to the well-known doctrine of United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). Under the Hutcheson case, which also involved an amendment to

the Clayton Act, a later statutory redefinition can be read to modify earlier statutes containing
the same term.
8. S. 2160, supra note 1, 132 CONG. REC. at S2281 ("For purposes of this section, the
ability to exercise market power is defined as the ability of one or more firms profitably to
maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time.").
9. The failure of the government to prosecute merger cases in recent years has prevented
some adjustments in merger law that courts would otherwise no doubt have made. Moreover,
private litigation can make only a limited contribution to the evolution of merger policy in
view of the difficult hurdle private litigants face in merger cases in establishing antitrust standing. See Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort of Colo., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986).
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Narrowing of Substantive Law

The most vital effect of the proposed change in the core language of
the Clayton Act would be to call into doubt almost every prior merger
decision. This unsettling result would occur because the substantive
heart of the statute under which all of the prior cases were decided would
be removed. In place of the existing statutory language "may ...substantially ...

lessen competition, or ...tend to create a monopoly," the

proposed amendment substitutes the entirely different language "significant probability that the acquisition will substantially increase the ability
to exercise market power." This new language is undefined in existing
merger decisions of the courts. The only reliable source to which a court
could turn to learn what this language means in terms of merger analysis
is the source from which it was taken-the Justice Department's current
Merger Guidelines.' 0 Thus, with a single stroke of the pen, the precedential value of all prior merger case law would be called into question.
The authority of the case law would be further weakened by the
proposed change in the statistical measure used to assess market concentration. The proposed Act mandates consideration of several specific factors in assessing the competitive effects of a merger, including "the
number and size distribution of firms."" This would replace the fourfirm concentration ratio that courts have almost universally used to measure market concentration. The new formulation would arguably require use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a mathematically complex
index which measures both number and size distribution of firms and
which is contained in the current Merger Guidelines. 12 Since the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index has no direct analogue in the case law, it
would be difficult to use the prior cases to determine what degree of concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index would be excessive under the Clayton Act. Instead, courts would inevitably look to
the standards in the Merger Guidelines, which are framed in terms of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Under these standards, almost half of the
horizontal mergers the Supreme Court has held to be unlawful would
raise no market concentration problems.1 3
The proposed amendment further provides that a merger will be unlawful only if the particular acquisition under scrutiny substantially increases the ability to exercise market power. That would appear to mean
10.

See supra note 3.

I1. S. 2160, § 2, stipra note 1, 132 CONG. Ri.c. at S2281.
12. Guidelines, supra note 3, 1'44493.10, 4493.101-.102.
13. See Fox, The New Merger Guidelines-A Bheprintfor Microeconomic Analysis, 27
ANTrIRus-r Bui.i.. 519 (1982).
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that a court could not declare a merger unlawful merely because it is part
of an accelerating merger wave that threatens to overwhelm competition.
Instead, the government would also have to prove that the particular
merger was at the tipping point, and would by itself move the market
from competitive to monopolistic conditions. This requirement would
reverse the result in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 4 which held that
under the Clayton Act courts could bar a merger that was part of an
accelerating trend toward excessive concentration even though monopolistic conditions had not yet been achieved.
Another change in existing law would be the immunization of mergers in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets where the merging firms are
already charging monopolistic prices. This immunity would occur because the proposed Act condemns mergers only when they increase a
firm's ability to charge a monopolistic price and not when they merely
perpetuate and entrench this ability. This effect would perpetuate a gap
presently contained in the Merger Guidelines, which condemn mergers
that increase market power but not mergers that entrench market power
already achieved.' 5
Neither would the proposed amendment be likely to reach mergers
that create monopolistic buying power-the power to force prices below
competitive levels-as distinct from monopolistic selling power. So long
as a merger did not lead to any clear and immediate ability to increase
resale prices, the formation of abusive buying power would presumably
be freely tolerated under the new law.
For all practical purposes the proposed amendment would also terminate enforcement against mergers injuring potential competition. A
merger injures potential competition when it forecloses the probability
that an outside firm will enter a monopolistic or oligopolistic market. It
would seldom, if ever, be possible to protect potential competition under
a legal test that requires a showing that a merger would directly enhance
a firm's ability to raise prices. This change would reverse the result in
such cases as Ford Motor Co. v. United States,16 United States v. Continental Can Co.,' 7 and FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 8 which barred
mergers that removed one of the few most probable entrants into an
oligopolistic market. It would also reject some or all of the legal doctrine
14.
15.

370 U.S. 294 (1962).
See Note, The Cellophane Fallacyand the JusticeDepartment's Guidelinesfor Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L.J. 670 (1985).
16. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).

17.
18.

378 U.S. 441 (1964).
386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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enunciated in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., ' 9 and United
States v. FalstaffBrewing Corp.,20 which attempted to define potential
competition in tractable, legally objective terms. Indeed, the proposed
amendment is less hospitable to the concept of potential competition
2
than the Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines themselves. '
Moreover, the proposed amendment would virtually eliminate enforcement against vertical and conglomerate mergers because, except in
the most exceptional of cases, a nonhorizontal merger will produce no
immediate ability to raise prices however anticompetitive its longer term
effects might be. The proposed amendment would therefore reverse the
results in such vertical or partially vertical merger cases as Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, Ford Motor Co. v. United States, and numerous
lower court decisions, as well as the result in FTC v. Proctor & Gamble
Co.,2 2 which prohibited a conglomerate merger on the theory of en23
trenchment of market dominance, and FTC v. Consolidated Foods,
which declared a conglomerate merger unlawful due to its reciprocity
effect. None of this is to say that antitrust enforcement against vertical
and conglomerate mergers should return to what it was in the 1960s, but
modifications should be made incrementally, informed by a full factual
record, interpreted in the light of current economic learning.
B. Increased Difficulties of Proof
The proposed amendment would severely increase the government's
burden of proof in merger cases. This effect by itself would preclude
effective merger enforcement even if there were no change in the substantive law. Mandating the use of an open-ended rule of reason analysis in
every merger case, the proposed bill enumerates six specific factors,
ranging from market structure and conduct to expected efficiencies, that
must be considered in addition to "any other evidence" that bears on the
ultimate issue of market power effects.2 4 This statutorily mandated, unbounded approach reverses the entire course of development of Supreme
19.

378 U.S. 158 (1964).

20.

410 U.S. 526 (1973).

21. See Brodley, PotentialCompetition Under the Merger Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REv.
376 (1983).
22. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
23. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
24. S. 2160, § 2(d), supra note 1, 132 CONG. REC. at S2281. The proposed factors are:
(i) the number and size distribution of firms and the effect of the acquisition thereon;
(ii) ease or difficulty of entry by foreign or domestic firms; (iii) the ability of smaller
firms in the market to increase production in response to an attempt to exercise market power; (iv) the nature of the product and terms of sale; (v) conduct of firms in the
market; (vi) efficiencies deriving from the acquisition; and (vii) any other evidence
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Court analysis which began in 1963 with United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank.2 5 In PhiladelphiaBank the Court squarely confronted
the fact that an open-ended judicial consideration of all conceivably relevant economic facts would make the legal consequences of a merger uncertain and thereby subvert the congressional intent that the law be
effectively enforced. To avoid such a result the Court declared that
whenever it was possible to do so, courts should, in the interest of sound
judicial administration, simplify the test of illegality, and accordingly the
Court adopted a presumption of illegality for horizontal mergers based
26
on the degree of market concentration.
In the light of enforcement experience, the Supreme Court in 1974
modified the legal test for horizontal mergers to allow consideration of
additional economic evidence in United States v. General Dynamics
Corp.,27 but still maintained the framework of an initial presumption of
illegality drawn from a limited set of accessible facts. Subsequent lower
court cases have expanded and developed the General Dynamics approach, considering economic factors that appear reasonably tractable
28
such as entry barriers and product characteristics.
The Merger Modernization Act appears to propose an entirely different approach. It would place the burden on the government to prove,
on the basis of all pertinent economic facts, that a merger creates a significant probability of substantially increased market power. The changed
burden of proof alone will in all probability prevent effective merger
enforcement.
Merger enforcement differs fundamentally from other types of antitrust enforcement in that the legality of a merger is usually tried before it
occurs. Under the present enforcement system, which involves prenotification of mergers, suits are filed before the merger takes place. Thus, the
assessment of competitive consequences occurs in advance. Without the
aid of a simplifying presumption of illegality, however rebuttable, and
with no evidentiary limitation on the type of proof that can be offered, it
appears unlikely that the government could ever prevail, particularly on
an issue requiring proof of the future behavior of prices. Instead, courts
indicating whether the acquisition will or will not substantially increase the ability,
unilaterally or collectively, to exercise market power.
25. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
26. Id. at 362, 365-66.
27.
28.

1984).

415 U.S. 486 (1974).
See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 171-73 (2d ed.
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would confront "the complex statistical and theoretical jungle" 29 that
vexed merger litigation prior to PhiladelphiaBank, and would tend naturally to decide the case against the party who has the burden of proofhere the government.
It is perfectly clear, therefore, why the existing merger statute was
drafted in terms of incipient effects-that is, a merger is unlawful if it
may lessen competition-and why it was necessary for the courts to
adopt simplified rules of presumption in order to implement the statutory
purpose. Without such an approach there can be no adequate enforcement against complex transactions, the effects of which must be assessed
in advance. If this enforcement scheme is to be abandoned, it would be
much simpler to repeal section 7 than to weigh it down with evidentiary
burdens that preclude its effectiveness.
II.

Promotion of International Competitiveness

It is difficult to think that the unprecedented package of major antitrust legislation, of which the Merger Modernization Act is a part, would
be before Congress were it not for the claim that antitrust enforcement in
some way impedes industrial competitiveness. Seemingly lending
credence to the claim, the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness last year recommended certain modifications of the antitrust
laws. 30 But the Commission's recommendations were far more confined
than the legislation now being sought, and even the need for the Commission's more limited recommendations has not been established.
As one of its thirty-two separate recommendations, the President's
Commission urged certain antitrust changes, including (1) modification
of the Clayton Act and other antitrust statutes to recognize efficiency
gains from business combinations, (2) definition of antitrust markets to
encompass global competition where it exists, and (3) the granting of
antitrust exemptions for mergers and other business relationships which
promote national objectives such as rationalization of production and,
more generally, "the public good."' 3 1 The proposed Antitrust Improvement Act introduced by Senator Metzenbaum responds directly to two of
these objectives, but the Merger Modernization Act goes far beyond anything recommended by the Commission.
Congress has in recent years been responsive to well-documented,
29. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 226, 291 (1960).
30. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETITION: THE NEW REALITY 192-93 (1985) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].

31.

Id. at 271.
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narrowly targeted proposals to modify the antitrust laws to promote industrial competitiveness. In 1982 Congress passed the Export Trading
Company Act, 32 which provided substantial antitrust immunity for properly qualified export trading companies. In 1984 Congress passed the National Cooperative Research Act, 33 which extended a similar substantial
immunity to research and development joint ventures. Both statutes
were adopted after specific showings that antitrust protection was needed
to induce firms to jointly undertake activities that would directly and
immediately promote United States competitiveness in critical areas-in
the one case exports and in the other innovation.
By contrast, the Merger Modernization Act-as well as most of the
other antitrust legislation the Administration now proposes-reflects an
entirely different attitude. The proposed legislation does not address a
particular problem of international competitiveness, as did the 1982 and
1984 Acts, but would weaken antitrust enforcement across all economic
sectors, whether or not they are subject to the impact of foreign
competition.
Certainly nothing in the Commission's report establishes the need
for drastic change in merger standards. Indeed, the few facts cited in the
Commission's very short discussion of its antitrust proposals (six pages
within a 391 page report) 34 are quite unpersuasive. For example, in arguing that United States firms need to be larger than they now are to com35
pete effectively in world markets the report presents the following data:
Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex of Concentration
Country
United States
Japan
West Germany
United Kingdom
World [U.S. share]

Chemicals

Steel

682
946
2,226
6,566
272

937
1,734
1,442
6,187
393

This table is intended to show that other industrial nations allow
their firms to grow much larger in national markets, presumably to the
disadvantage of United States firms in world competition. But only a few
pages earlier the report states that chemicals are one of the United
36
States's most successful exports, while steel is one of its least successful.
32.
33.

96 Stat. 1233-35 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1982)).
98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).

34.

2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 30, at 188-93.

35. Id. at 189.
36. Id. at 181.

556
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Thus, it is no more reasonable to conclude that merger constraints explain our lack of success in steel manufacturing than it is to conclude
that they are responsible for our success in chemicals. Similarly, the near
monopoly position allowed British Steel within the United Kingdom, albeit a relatively small market, does not appear to be linked to any unusual success by that firm in export markets.
Effective competition in world markets does require improved competitive strategies, but the Commission's report fails to demonstrate that
market-concentrating mergers are the answer. Indeed, a principal author
of the report has recently suggested that successful strategies are much
more likely to involve joint ventures and other coalitions short of
38
merger. 37 The recent report of the European Economic Community
reaches a similar conclusion, and in noting the need for "fundamental
structural changes" to make European industry more competitive,
speaks of "facilitating cooperation between firms" not by mergers, but by
joint ventures. Clearly, amendment of the Clayton Act is not required in
order to ensure permissive treatment of joint ventures or recognition of
efficiency benefits in joint venture cases, for the law is already
39
permissive.
The President's Commission also called for realistic definition of
4°
economic markets so as to recognize global competition where it exists.
One can agree entirely with this recommendation without conceding that
any amendment of the antitrust laws is necessary. The report certainly
presents no evidence suggesting that modern courts are unwilling to recognize international competition where it exists. Indeed, as long ago as
the Alcoa case Judge Learned Hand defined the relevant market to include the shipments of aluminum imports that competed with domestic
production. 4 1 Moreover, Judge Hand was perfectly clear in his statement that he would have included not only current imports but all foreign capacity as well had he not concluded that tariff and other trade
42
barriers imposed an effective ceiling on imports.
The Antitrust Improvement Act contains a specific provision that
would direct courts to consider foreign competition in merger or joint
venture cases when any reduction in competition between United States
37.

(1986).
38.

See Porter, ChangingPatternsof InternationalCompetition, 27 CAL. MGMT. REv. 9

15th Report on Competition Policy of the EEC (1986).

39. See generally Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521
(1982).
40. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 30, at 192.
41. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
42. Id. at 426.
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43
firms would be offset by increased foreign sales in the United States.
While this provision is declarative of present law, it would make clear
that foreign sales are to be considered when it is economically realistic to
do so. On the other hand, a specific provision of this kind applicable only
to mergers and joint ventures creates the possibility of a negative inference that foreign sales are to be treated differently under the Sherman
Act or other antitrust statutes. Problems of technical construction of the
specific statutory language in relation to present law might also arise. If
all that is intended is a restatement of existing law, the provision might
instead simply declare that foreign competition, realistically assessed,
should be taken into account in defining markets for antitrust purposes.

III. Recognition of an Efficiencies Defense
The proposed Merger Modernization Act and the Antitrust Improvement Act both require antitrust courts to take economic efficiencies
into account in ruling on mergers."4 Consideration of efficiencies in
merger cases poses extreme difficulties, however, and if undertaken at all
should be done under tight constraints.
The problem with considering efficiencies in merger cases is that it
would require courts to assess the outcome of a highly complex transaction before it has occurred. A merger involves a meshing of diverse and
often scattered physical facilities, financial assets, and personnel that
were never designed to be part of a single organization. Will the union be
a success, or will it be a disaster, or will it produce indifferent results in
terms of efficiencies? A mandatory efficiencies defense would require a
court to make this exceedingly difficult assessment on a purely hypothetical basis, informed only by the claims and counterclaims of interested
litigants. Under such circumstances it is difficult to think that courts
could be any more successful in picking out the efficient mergers from
among the inefficient than are financial analysts and managers, whose
batting average is, to say the least, remarkably uneven. Moreover, the
courts would not only have to identify whether a merger will produce
efficiencies, but also whether such efficiencies will then outweigh anticompetitive effects, which must also be assessed in advance.
In determining whether an efficiencies defense should be introduced
it is important to bear in mind that efficiencies considerations already
shape merger and other antitrust rules. The basic substantive standards
43. S. 2022, supra note 4, 132 CONG. REC. at S338.
44. S. 2022, § 5, supra note 4, 132 CONG. REC. at 5338; S. 2160, § 2(d), supra note 1, 132
CONG. REC. at 52281; see supra note 24.
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for mergers are drawn with a view to permitting most mergers to go
through, thereby allowing any efficiencies to be realized. Indeed, the
present Merger Guidelines relaxed the standards for merger enforcement
precisely to allow greater latitude for potentially efficient mergers, 45 and
recent merger cases reflect a similar viewpoint, thus further reducing the
chance that substantial efficiencies are being lost through overly stringent
merger policy. In addition, joint ventures and similar limited cooperative
undertakings between firms are treated even more permissively than
mergers. 46 Since these transactions are frequently alternatives to merger,
a blocked merger may simply be rechannelled into a joint venture or another less restrictive contractual undertaking, rather than be prohibited
altogether.
Nevertheless, some believe that current antitrust rules bar a nontrivial number of mergers in which significant efficiencies could be
achieved. I know of no way to test the truth of that proposition, but even
if one accepts it, it does not necessarily follow that courts should be
asked to assess efficiencies in advance. Instead, we must face up to the
fact that if direct assessment of efficiencies is to be undertaken in merger
proceedings, an after-the-fact procedure is needed to audit whether the
claimed efficiencies actually resulted. That is, at some point following a
merger approved on efficiency grounds, say after five years, the proceeding should be reopened and the parties required to prove that efficiencies
were actually achieved. When a subsequent audit determines that the
promised efficiencies were not realized, additional relief can then be administered to restore competitive conditions. It is only by such a procedure that before-the-fact efficiency claims can be kept honest. In West
Germany, the Federal Cartel Office presently follows a procedure for after-the-fact audits of efficiency claims, particularly in cases involving
joint ventures.
Turning to the specific legislation proposed, the Merger Modernization Act would require courts to consider efficiencies as a factor of analysis in every merger case.47 This places an undue burden on the courts
and complicates the decision beyond any benefit that appears likely. The
bill fails to state explicitly who has the burden of proof on the issue, yet
clearly the burden should be placed on the defendants since, as the actual
participants, they are in the best position to demonstrate the facts.
45. Guidelines, supra note 3, at 4490.
46. See General Motors Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp., 49 Fed. Reg. 18,289, 18,291
(FTC 1984) (consent order) (statement of James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC) ("important to
separate reality from rhetoric" in analyzing joint venture as opposed to merger).
47. S. 2160, supra note 1, 132 CONG. REC. at S2281-82.
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The proposed Antitrust Improvement Act adopts a much better approach to the problem, which, although not entirely free of difficulties,
would regularize the present procedure by which efficiencies are taken
into account by the Antitrust Division and the FTC in the exercise of
their enforcement discretion. 48 Senator Metzenbaum's bill would establish a common filing procedure and specifies the kinds of cost savings
that would qualify as recognizable efficiencies, properly excluding merely
pecuniary savings and speculative gains, such as "learning effect" benefits. The burden is correctly on the defendants both to demonstrate the
presence of efficiencies by clear and convincing evidence and to show that
the cost saving could not be achieved by a less restrictive alternative.
In addition, the bill provides for a certification procedure whereby
the FTC may certify that a merger is likely to reduce costs and will promote competition. 49 This certification can then be introduced in any future antitrust proceeding involving the merger. The difficulty with this
proposal is that the certification does not arise out of a contested proceeding, or indeed one in which anyone but the interested parties is likely
to be involved. Unless provision is made for the participation of adverse
litigants, it seems undesirable to allow the introduction of the certification in a subsequent proceeding except as against the government. Furthermore, if the FTC is to effectively monitor complex efficiency claims,
it should be provided with funds to engage management consultants as
independent experts in appropriate cases.
A more limited approach to efficiencies consideration in merger
cases would be to limit the FTC certification procedure to joint ventures,
and then to provide specifically for subsequent audit by the FTC to determine if efficiencies were in fact realized or if the efficiency benefit
achieved outweighed any restraints on competition. If the results of
either inquiry are negative, the unwinding of the joint venture or administration of other curative relief would present less difficulty than in a
merger case because the joint venture participants would have retained
their separate institutional identities. After the results of this more limited efficiencies procedure are observed, it would be possible to determine
whether it is feasible to extend the procedure to mergers in general.
IV.

Merger Enforcement Procedures

The Antitrust Improvement Act proposes to strengthen merger enforcement procedures in several ways. Changes in these procedures do
48.
49.

S. 2022, supra note 4, 132 CONG. REC. at S338-39.
Id. § 5(b), 132 CONG. REC. at S338.
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not raise the same problem of undermining common-law judicial development as does revision of substantive standards, and in fact there have
been several procedural modifications of the antitrust statutes over the
years. Two proposals of particular interest are those relating to divestiture standards and access to investigatory files by state attorneys general.
With increasing frequency the relief in merger cases involves divestiture of some portion of the acquired assets. But such divestitures often
raise severe problems of viability. This is not difficult to understand since
the assets being divested were never designed to stand on their own or
even to be part of another firm, but were intended to function within the
firm from which they are now being separated. In the past many such
divestitures have failed to restore competition, 50 and it is unclear whether
recent divestitures have been more successful. The provisions of the Antitrust Improvement Act that would require strict standards of competitive viability for divested assets appear highly desirable, at least in the
light of past experience. Congress should also require periodic reports
from the enforcement agencies on the effectiveness of curative relief in
merger cases. These reports would both provide needed information on
the efficacy of merger remedies and serve as a source of discipline to
enforcement agencies in administering such remedies.
State attorneys general provide a vital source of independent enforcement for the antitrust laws. Unlike private litigants they directly
reflect the public interest, yet at the same time they present a viewpoint
distinct from that of federal enforcement authorities. Under the HartScott-Rodino Act, documents and information obtained in premerger
notification procedures are confidential, 51 however, and state attorneys
general have been unable to obtain access to such information even for
the purpose of providing federal enforcement authorities with useful
comments and recommendations.
From personal experience I know how difficult it is to make informed comments on a pending merger or joint venture investigation if
one lacks access to the facts being evaluated by the enforcement agency.
Recently in attempting to comment to the FTC on the antitrust implications of the General Motors-Toyota joint venture, I was limited to the
information published in the newspapers, although the actual joint venture agreement was no doubt on file with the FTC. As a result my comments were less informed and helpful than they might otherwise have
50.
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been. It is perhaps impractical to make investigatory information available to those who represent private parties opposing a merger or joint
venture, but clearly state attorneys general could be allowed access on a
confidential basis. Federal enforcement can only be improved if it receives the benefit of informed comments from a sister enforcement
agency.
Conclusion
The constitution-like generality of the statutory tests of antitrust
have made it possible for courts and enforcement agencies to adjust by
incremental change to shifting economic circumstances. From time to
time Congress has intervened in the development of antitrust law by statutory amendment, but with rare exception this intervention has been in
response to a narrowly articulated and specific need, as in the recently
enacted Export Trading Company Act and National Cooperative Research Act.
The Administration's proposed Merger Modification Act represents
a sharp break from these previous policies of incremental and focused
change. The Administration seeks to codify its current enforcement policy, enunciated in the 1984 Merger Guidelines, by changing the foundational language of the Clayton Act. In fact, the proposed bill would
delete from the statutory test the word "competition" itself, substituting
for all of the values encompassed in that historic term a single index of
power over price. Such an alteration is defended on the basis of current
economic learning. But that very defense supplies the decisive reason
why the statute should not be so amended.
Economics and business science are not static fields. Today the Justice Department castigates the antitrust views of an earlier period, but a
future generation may look back on their views with less than full acclamation. Suppose, for example, that the antitrust decisions of the Warren
Court or the 1968 Merger Guidelines had been codified. Had that happened we should now be faced with the problem of rewriting statutory
law in order to adjust antitrust to modern economic conditions. We
should no more attempt to bind the future enforcers of antitrust law than
our predecessors sought to bind us. We ought not to freeze a specialized
interpretation of competition into the Clayton Act. Instead, we should
recognize that our knowledge, like the knowledge of those who preceded
us, is finite and our vision limited. Thus, rejecting efforts to enact global
wisdom, we should adhere to the common-law approach in antitrust of
incremental change and gradual evolution.

